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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GEORGE R. BRADFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 200000126
Priority No. 16

ANDREA O. BRADFORD and
JAMES A. DEMITA,
Defendant-Appellant.
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF
ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
1. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is reported as
Bradford v. DeMita, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999); 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 26.
STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH JURISDICTION OF
SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion on December 16,1999.
1. There have been no orders respecting either a rehearing or an extension of
time in this matter.
2. Since this Response is not a cross-petition, there is no reliance made on Rule
47(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended). The writ of certiorari is sought in order to review
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claims of the Petitioner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were married in June 1985, in Provo, Utah (Findings
of Fact No. 1, p. 152, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 37).
2.

Effective July 14, 1998, the lower court found that the existence of

irreconcilable differences between Mr. and Mrs. Bradford made the continuation of
their marriage no longer possible (Findings of Fact No. 3, p. 152, Record).
3. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford are 63 and 65 years old, respectively (Findings of Fact
No. 6, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 89).
4. While there were married, Mrs. Bradford possessed few assets other than
some personal property and land in Indianola, Utah. After paying the debt on this land
with money given to her by her husband, Mrs. Bradford eventually sold this land. She
kept all of the profits herself (Findings of Fact No. 7, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 34).
5. During the marriage, Mrs. Bradford worked at temporary jobs. Because she
has trouble focusing on her task and may have carpal tunnel syndrome, she is unable
to work (Findings of Fact No. 10, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 90-92).
6. Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150.00 per month in child care for
taking care of her granddaughter and $381.00 in Social Security, which amounts to
2

$531.00 in monthly income (Findings of Fact No. 11, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at
93).
7. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford can be retained or develop new skills in order
to substantially increase their income (Findings of Fact No. 12, p. 151, Record).
8. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have lived in Mr. Bradford's home in Spanish Fork,
Utah, since the beginning of their marriage. This home was paid for and then given to
Mr. Bradford ar an inheritance gift before he married Mrs. Bradford. Mr. Bradford
was born and raised in this house, and it has been passedfromgeneration to generation
within his family (Findings of Fact No. 13, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 34-35).
9. Neither party disputes that the value of the home is $180,000.00 (Findings of
Fact No. 17, p. 150 Record).
10. Mr. Bradford deeded the home by way of warranty deed to he and Mrs.
Bradford as "joint tenants with fullrightsof survivorship and not at tenants in common:
approximately four years after they had married (Findings of Fact No. 18, p. 150,
Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 44).
11. Mr. Bradford filed for divorcefromMrs. Bradford in 1992. At that time,
Mr. Bradford requested that both the home and other real property be awarded to him.
The divorce action was dismissed in 1993 (Findings of Fact No. 19, p. 150, Record)
(3/4/98 Tr. at 55).
3

12. Since 1992, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments, and Mr.
Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions (Findings of Fact
No. 20, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 55).
13. James DeMita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been living with Mr. and
Mrs. Bradford since 1995. Mr. DeMita's son also stays at the homefromtime to time.
In exchange for these living arrangements, Mr. DeMita neither pays rent nor the utility
bill and resides in the home rent-free (Findings of Fact No. 21, p. 150, Record).
14. Mr. DeMita attended one year of law school and has since worked at
various jobs. At the time of the trial, Mr. DeMita was employed on a part-time basis
at a computer store. His 1996 gross income was approximately $3,500.00 (Findings
of Fact No. 22, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 106-08).
15. In July 1996, Mr. Bradford discovered various engineers in his home when
he entered his house. Although the reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs.
Bradford are in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the project's development. This
argument was more severe man the others, and divorce was again discussed (Findings
of Fact No. 24, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 38-40).
16. On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford deeded her share of the home by way of
quit claim deed to her son James DeMita. Mr. DeMita gave his mother $10.00 for the
transaction (Findings of Fact No. 25, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 4-10).
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17. Ten Dollars ($10.00) is not the equivalent value of one-half of the house and
property (Findings of Fact No. 26, p. 149, Record).
18. Because Mr. DeMita is Mrs. Bradford's son, the quit-claim transfer of her
property to his name was made to an "insider," according to Utah Law (Findings of
Fact No. 27, p. 149, Record).
19. Although she deeded her portion of the property to Mr. DeMita rather than
any of her other children, Mrs. Bradford claimed that the transfer was made for estate
planning purposes. At trial, however, she acknowledged that she did not prepare a will
nor did she prepare any instructions whatsoever regarding the disposition of the
property (Findings of Fact No. 28, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 10-14).
20. After this transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. DeMita continued to live in the
home as they had before (Findings of Fact No. 29, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 1214).
21. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. DeMita ever told Mr. Bradford about the
quit-claim transfer. Mr. Bradford discovered the existence of the deed when his
daughter went to the recorder's office to verify that the home and property had been
re-zoned for development as Mr. DeMita had mentioned. At this time, the daughter
discovered the quit-claim deed and that the property had actually never been re-zoned
(Findings of Fact No. 30, p.149-49, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 14,42,45).
5

22. After discovering this information, Mr. Bradford commenced another
divorce action against his wife. The time between the granting of the deed and the
filing of divorce was approximately 11 months (Findings of Fact No. 31, p. 148,
Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 46).
23. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home to her son left her in
possession of only her personal property, which was limited value. Thus, this transfer
constituted substantially all of her assets (Findings of Fact No. 32, p. 148, Record).
24. When asked on cross-examination whether she could afford to pay Mr.
Bradford for one-half of the property's value, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she would
not be able to do so, but that she would have to rely on family members if she were
obligated to pay such a sum (Findings of Fact No. 33, p. 148, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at
101-02).
25. At the time of the transfer of the quit-claim deed, Mrs. Bradford should have
reasonably believed that Mr. Bradford might seek to divorce her, and that he would
probably claim the home and property as his own as he had done so in the previous
1992 divorce action (Findings of Fact No. 34, p. 148, Record).
26. The house and property are not partitionable, as they contain a residence,
road and river frontage. If an interest were conveyed, the house would have to be
refinanced or sold (Findings of Fact No. 35, p. 148, Record).
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27. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's name on the deed to the
house in 1992, the trial court found that the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford
since he inherited thisfromhis father before he married Mrs. Bradford. This finding is
consistent with previous Utah Supreme Court decisions wherein the parties married
later in life, and one of the parties had brought into the marriage an inheritance gift
which was subsequently deeded to the other party. See Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627
P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) (Findings of
Fact No. 36, p. 148, Record).
28. Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income, but she cannot make
up for this shortfall. Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month after
expenses. Therefore, Mr. Bradford is required to pay Mrs. Bradford $600.00 per
month in alimony for a term not to exceed the length of the marriage. This gives
$1,131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses and leaves $1,058.00 for Mr.
Bradford's expenses (Findings of Fact No. 40, p. 147, Record).
ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Utah Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court correctly ruled that
Mrs. Bradford was a "creditor" of Mr. Bradford, is not only a correct ruling based on
the facts of this case, but is consistent with Utah statutory authority.
The past disposition of this case by both the trial and appellate courts can be
7

characterized thus: When this issue was litigated during divorce proceedings, the trial
court determined that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §25-6-2(4) and §25-6-5, plaintiff
was a creditor of defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, set aside the transfer, and
held that plaintiff was a creditor with a claim. Indeed, since this very issue is in
question here, the Court of Appeal's language is quoted in its entirety:
A "creditor," according to section 25-6-2(4), "means a
person who has a claim." A "'claim' means a right to payment,
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Utah Code
Ann. §25-6-2(3) (1998); see also Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,
206, 48 P.2d 513, 516 (1935) (holding persons having tort claim
against grantor that was not reduced to judgment at time of
conveyance are "creditors").
Although no Utah cases directly address whether a husband
or wife becomes a creditor of his or her spouse when
contemplating divorce, the Oregon Supreme Court's statement on
the subject is helpful to our analysis:
In Weber v. Rothchild, 15 Ore. 385, 388-89,15 P. 650, 3
Am. St. Rep. 162 (1887), we held that a person in the position of
plaintiff may maintain a suit to set aside a transaction which may
defeat her recovery and rights in a contemplated suit [**8] for
divorce. This rule prevails in other jurisdictions that have
considered the matter.
We conclude, as did the trial court, that the conveyance by
deed of April 14,1972, was obtained byfraudto hinder or prevent
plaintiffs recovery of [defendant's] equitable interest in the
fourplex, in the divorce suit, and is therefore set aside and held to
be void.
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Adamson v. Adamson, 273 Ore. 382,541 P.2d 460,466 (Or. 1975)
(citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court determined that "pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §25-6-2(4) and §25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a creditor of
Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which
Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. DeMita." The trial court
based this conclusion on the fact that Mr. Bradford had threatened
divorce just weeks before Mrs. Bradford made the transfer. That
conclusion is consistent with the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis
in Adamson, which we adopt. In our view, the trial court correctly
concluded Mr. Bradford was, indeed, a creditor of Mrs. Bradford,
given that his claim to the house—although not reduced to judgment
in a divorce proceeding-had arisen through recent threats of [**9]
divorce. We note this conclusion is consistent with our supreme
court's admonition to construe the statute liberally "to reach all
artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force and
effect." Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244,1260 (Utah 1987); see
also Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,291, 351 P.2d 959, 962
(1960) ('"All statutes made against fraud should be liberally and
beneficially expounded to suppress thefraud.'")(quoting Twyne's
Case, 16 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601)).
Bradford v. DeMita, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999) 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 26.
Appellee can offer little more guidance than that issued by the above-mentioned
holding. The Court of Appeals issued its ruling in light of case law that admonishes
courts to be wary of a debtor's activity that could be deemed asfraudulentvis-a-vis a
creditor. This admonition was heeded when the Court went to the very language of the
act - finding that future threats of divorce, especially in hght of the facts at hand (a
particularly contentious marriage with numerous talks about separation) - indicated that
9

Mr. Bradford was a creditor with a claim.
CONCLUSION
The decision of both the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court below it
represent clear applications of statutory construction, reliance on appropriate precedent,
and the overall charge to read the UFCA in a way that will protect individuals just like
Mr. Bradford, a man whose family home was titled awayfromhim, without notice,
only after Mrs. Bradford realized that she might very well lose an interest in the home
altogether.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this iHi^ day of April, 2000.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

THOMAS R. PATTON
Attorney for Appellee
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this /%^-day of April, 2000, two
copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
following:
James DeMita
Appellant
1138 East 100 North
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
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ADDENDUM
Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Code Ann. §25-6-2(4) and §25-6-5
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended)
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

may petition separately, or any two or more of them may join
in a petition When two or more cases are sought to be
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related
questions, it will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of
certiorari covering all the cases A cross petition for writ of
certiorari shall not be joined with any other filing
(b) Parties All parties to the proceeding in the Court of
Appeals shall be deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless
the petitioner notifies the Clerk of the Supreme Court in
writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the parties
below have no interest in the outcome of the petition A copy of
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding
below, and a party noted as no longer interested may remain
a party by notifying the clerk, with service on the other
parties, t h a t the party has an interest in the petition
(c) Motion foi ceitification and transmission of record A
party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing
the petition or at any time pnor to action by the Supreme
Court on the petition, may file a motion for an order to have
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the t n a l court
certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its
transmission to the Supreme Court Motions to certify the
record prior to action on the petition by the Supreme Court
should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to the
Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the
brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived
from the contents of the petition or the brief in opposition,
including the appendix If a motion is appropriate, it shall be
made to the Supreme Coui t after the filing of a petition but
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition In the
case of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of
Appeals, such a motion may be made before the filing of the
petition Thereafter, the Clerk of the Supreme Court or any
party to the case may request that additional parts of the
record be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court
Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness of petition A petition for a writ of certiorari
must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30
days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of
Appeals The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the
petition
(b) Refusal of petition The clerk will refuse to receive any
petition for a writ of certiorari which is beyond the time
indicated in paragraph (a) of this rule or which is not accompanied by the docket fee
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing The time for filing a
petition for a w n t of certiorari runs from the date the decision
is entered by the Court of Appeals, not from the date of the
issuance of the remittitur If a petition for rehearing is timely
filed by any party, the time for filing the petition for a writ of
certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of
rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered
upon the rehearing
(d) Time for cross petition
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of
this rule, or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of
certiorari
(2) Any cross-petition timel} only pursuant to paragraph
(d)(lXB) of this rule will not be granted unless a timely
petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is
granted
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the
cross petition The cleik shall refuse an> cross petition not
accompanied by the docket fee

R u l e 49

(4) A cross petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined
with any other filing The clerk of the court shall refuse any
filing so joined
(e) Extension of time The Supreme Court, upon a shovwng
of excusable neglect or good cause may extend the time foi
filing a petition or a cross petition for a writ of certiorari upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, whichever
is applicable Any such motion which is filed before expiration
of the prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme
Court otherwise requires Notice of any such motion which is
filed after expiration of the presenbed time shall be given to
the other parties No extension shall exceed 30 days past the
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later
(f) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the
same as provided in Rule 26
Rule 49. P e t i t i o n for writ of certiorari.
(a) Contents The petition for a writ of certiorari shall
contain, in the order indicated
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case in the Supreme Court contains the names of all
parties
(2) A table of contents with page references
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged
and with parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes,
and authorities cited, with references to the pages of the
petition where they are cited
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary
detail The statement of the questions should be short and
concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable The
statement of a question presented \v ill be deemed to comprise
every subsidiary question fairly included therein Only t h e
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein
will be considered by the Supreme Court
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any
opinions issued by the Court of Appeals
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked, showing
(A) t h e date of the entry of the decision sought to be
reviewed,
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing
and the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an
extension of time within which to petition for certiorari,
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a
writ of certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition
for a writ of certiorari in connection with which the crosspetition is filed, and
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction on
the Supreme Court
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and regulations set forth verbatim with the a p p r o p n
ate citation If the controlling provisions involved are lengthy,
their citation alone will suffice and their pertinent text shall
be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph (10) of
this paragraph
(8) A statement of the case The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of the
proceedings, and its disposition in the lower courts There
shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported b> citations to the
record before and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals

r
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, othei
than a person who holds the securities
(1) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre
tionary power to vote the securities, or
(n) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote,
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a
person who holds the securities
(1) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power
to vote the securities, or
(n) solely to secuie a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote,
(c) a person whose business is operated by the
debtor under a lease or other agreement, 01 a person
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the
debtor, or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business
under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not
include
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a
valid hen,
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt
under nonbankruptcy law, or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not
the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim
(7) "Insider" includes
(a) if t h e debtor is an individual
(I) a relative of the debtor or of a general
partner of the debtor,
(n) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner,
(m) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7Xa)(n),
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a
director, officer, or person in control, or
(v) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager,
(b) if the debtor is a corporation
(I) a director of the debtor,
(n) an officer of the debtor,
(in) a person in control of the debtor,
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner,
(v) a general partner m a partnership described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv),
(vi) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager, or
(vn) a relative of a general partner director,
officer, or person in control of the debtor,
(c) if the debtor is a partnership
(I) a general partner m the debtor,
(n) a relative of a general partner in, a general
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor,
(m) another partnership in which the debtor is
a general partner,

jxtwju
(iv) a general partner in a partnership descnbed in Subsection (7)(c)(in),
(v) a limited liability company of which the
debtoi is a member or manager, or
(vi) a person in control of the debtor,
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company
d) a member or manager of the debtor,
(n) anothei limited liability company in which
the debtor is a member or manager,
(in) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner,
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(d)(in),
(v) a pei son in control of the debtor, or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member,
manager or person in contiol of the debtor,
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the
affiliate were the debtor, and
(f) a managing agent of the debtor
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an
obligation, and includes a secunty interest created by
agieement, a judicial hen obtained by legal or equitable
process or proceedings, a common-law hen, or a statutory
hen
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited
liability company, corporation, association, organization,
government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial
entity
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the
third degree as determined by the common law, or a
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and
creation of a lien or other encumbrance
(13) "Valid hen" means a hen that is effective against
the holder of a judicial hen subsequently obtained by legal
or equitable process or proceedings
1992
25-6-3. Insolvency.
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they
become due is presumed to be insolvent
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate,
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership
debts
(4) Assets under this section do not include property t h a t
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to
hinder delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to
the extent it is secured by a valid hen on property of the debtor
not included as an asset
1988
25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer oi an obligation if, in
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred
or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied However, value
does not include an unperformed promise made other t h a n m

493

d U U l V ^ l / U U ^/VJL^JU

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

30 district judges in the Third District,
12 district judges in the Fourth District,
four district judges in the Fifth District,
two district judges in the Sixth District,
three district judges in the Seventh District, and
two distnctjudges in the Eighth District
1998

78-1*2.3 N u m b e r of j u v e n i l e j u d g e s a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
The number of juvenile court judges shall be
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District,
(2) five juvenile judges in the Second Juvenile District,
(3) eight juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District,
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District,
(5) two juvenile judges in the Fifth Juvenile District,
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District,
(7) two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile District, and
(8) one juvenile judge in the Eighth Juvenile District
1999

78-1*2.4,78-1-3.

Repealed.
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CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section
78-2^1

Number of justices — Tbi ms — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions
78-2^1 5, 78-2-16 Repealed
78 2*2
Supreme Court jurisdiction
78-2*3
Repealed
78-2-4
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law
78-2-5
Repealed
78-2-6
Appellate court administrator
78-2-7
Repealed
78-2-7 5
Service of sheriff to court
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 Repealed
78-2-1.

N u m b e r of j u s t i c e s — Terms — Chief j u s t i c e
a n d a s s o c i a t e chief j u s t i c e — Selection a n d
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more t h a n
three years after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in January following the date of election A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices The term of the office of chief justice is four
years The chief justice may serve successive terms The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning fiom the Supreme Court The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chiefjustice within 30
days of a vacancy in t h a t office, the associate chief justice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by
law

(6) There is cieated the office of associate chief justice The
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years The
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms The associate chief justice shall be
elected b> a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shaJJ be allocated duties as the chief justice determines If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate
chief justice as consistent with law
1990
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971,1981

78-2-2 S u p r e m e C o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decreeb or in aid of its jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals,
(c) discipline of lawyers,
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission,
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with
(I) the Public Service Commission,
(n) the State Tax Commission,
(in) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees,
dv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer, or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands,
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e),
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the U t a h Constitution,
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony,
d) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony,
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction, and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony,
(b) election and voting contests,
(c) reapportionment of election districts,
(d) retention or removal of public officers,
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas, and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall

